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The object of the present paper is the philosophical commentary , a form of literature 
that once predominated in all major philosophical cultures from classical Greece to 
Renaissance Italy, but which has more recently fallen into comparative disuse. Commen-
taries on the writings of German thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Marx and Heidegger have, 
certainly, kept the form alive to some extent in recent centuries; in the tradition of 
philosophy that was initiated by Descartes and Locke, however, and which constitutes the 
contemporary mainstream, the commentary genre has been utilized in systematic ways 
hardly at all, almost always by those concerned with other traditions, most especially with 
the philosophy of classical Greece. 
Why, then , should what has earlier proved so vital a plant in the literature of 
philosophy be so conspicuously absent from the philosophy of today? And why, uniquely 
among the canonical texts of contemporary analytic philosophy, should it be the writings 
of Wittgenstein that have spawned the growth of a commentary literature? 
Whal is a commentary? 
It has been taken for granted in the above that there is a sharp distinction between 
'commentary ' on the one hand, and works of ' secondary literature' on the other. Roughly 
speaking we can say that where examples of the former- which typically feature the word 
'commentary' in their title - are oriented around the very words of the relevant object-
text, this textual orientation gives way in the latter to a concern for ideas and arguments . 
Clearly matters here are rather complicated, and one can easily come up with examples 
of intervening forms whose classification is on this basis difficult to decide. It is possible, 
though , by examining the focal instances of the commentary genre - for example the 
"long" Aristotle-commentaries of Averroes ("the Commentator") - to specify certain 
marks of the commentary which suffice to distinguish it strictly from works of secondary 
literature as nowadays standardly conceived. Above all commentaries - not only philo-
sophical commentaries but also legal, religious, and other commentary forms - are set 
apart by the fact that 
(l) they deal with their respective object-texts line-for-line or paragraph-for-
paragraph; they are built out of actual segments of the object-text itself (or out of 
stylized reminders , where the author of the commentary can presuppose that his 
readers know the object-text by heart); 
(2) their order and structure is determined by the order and structure of this object-
text; 
(3) they deal with the ideas conveyed by this text exclusively in loco citato. 
Interpretative works, in contrast, deal with texts primarily for the sake of the ideas 
which they contain; they will take these ideas in the order that is dictated by the needs of 
the interpretation; and they will avail themselves of the freedom to discuss the ideas 
without concerning themselves with the precise original formulation . 
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Why do commentaries arise 7 
Commentaries grow up around a philosophical work, crudely and trivially speaking, 
because it has become necessary to make this work more easily accessible . This is 
normally for a plurality of reasons, not all of them strictly philosophical. The first real 
commentary to a philosophical author seems to have been Antisthenes ' explanation of 
Heraclitus , a philosopher who already in antiquity was referred to as "the dark one" in 
reflection of the obscurity of his style. 2 
Commentaries will arise , however, not only because of the density or impenetra-
bility of a given work, but also because a text is too short, or too aphoristic , or too 
fragmentarily preserved for immediate understanding. Thus English philosophical texts 
have been spared the hand of commentary not least because they are normally available 
in complete and uncorrupted forms and employ a language still in common use. 
The fact that commentaries are defined precisely by the fact that they are built out 
of actual segments of the object-text will imply that commentaries as such will arise where 
the very words of a text enjoy their own intrinsic importance (as in the case of an age-old 
esoteric ritual or legal process). We might refer to this as the hagiographic dimension of 
the commentary literature , the term "hagiography" being understood in a sense wide 
enough to include all the different sorts of veneration or respect for an author which are 
able to justify the expenditure of exceptional efforts in grappling with the difficulties of 
his text. 
It is understandable in this light why commentaries should have been produced 
especially in rel ation to works that have enjoyed a certain national or religious signifi-
cance - works that are seen as contributing to the cultural integrity or exclusivity and to 
the moral training of a given society and which may have come to enjoy official 
recognition as such. Such master texts are distinguished not only by the fact that they are 
in some sense objects of veneration in the given society. They are often marked further 
by special mnemotechnical powers , reflecting the fact that many of them arose at a time 
when the only available verbal technology for the preservation of ideas and values in 
transmission was that of the rhythmic word. 3 And they are distingui shed al so by their 
breadth or uni versa! ity . Consider, for example, the case of Virgi I, or Dante, or Shakespeare. 
Or consider the case of Homer ("from whom all men have learned since the beginning") , 
who was responsible for establishing that common Greek language which allowed the 
whole Greek people forthe first time to feel its unity , in spite of all differences of race and 
class : 
the poets in general and Homer in particular were not only considered as the source 
of instruction in ethics and administrative skills but also enjoyed a sort of 
institutional status in Greek society. This status received, as it were, state support, 
because they supplied a training which the social and political mechanism relied 
on for its efficient working. 4 
So intimate was the connection between master text and commentary that the poet 
Gower, when setting out to produce, in his Confessio Amantis, "a bok for Engelondes 
sake" , was careful to supply the work with its own apparatus of glosses and summaries 
and with an opening passage designed to resemble the prologue to a Scriptural commen-
tary .5 
Philosophers, too , have sought repeatedly in the course of history to usurp in their 
writings the rol e of the Homeric encyclopedia. It is this which accounts for the des ire, still 
alive today - though not in all philosophical cultures - to extend one ' s philosophizing 
across the entire available breadth of philosophy in the way that this was done for example 
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by Aristotle or Kant or Hegel. And it is more than anything else the fact that works of 
philosophy themselves may enjoy to some degree the role of master texts in certain 
cultures that acco unts for the fact that philosophy itself is taken seriously in those 
cultures, both by its practitioners and also by a wider public . 
A prime text may however enjoy not merely a cultural but also an evidential status, so 
that commentaries may arise also in reflection of the fact that given texts come to be 
awarded a role in the evaluation and accreditation of philosophical or scientific (or legal 
or religious) doctrines. Thus the medieva l term auctor "denoted someone who was at once 
a writer and an au thority , someone not merely to be read but also to be respected and 
be! ieved. " 6 
ln much of Marxist philosophy, too , one writes commentaries because the agreement 
of an author with the very word of Marx or Engels or Lenin counts as evidence for the 
correctness of what one has to say. It is especially with scholastic philosophy, however, 
that the phenomenon in question is most apparent. The frequent incidence of acknowl-
edged or unacknowledged quotations from other writings in medieval works is an external 
sign of the evidence-giving role of ' tradition ' or 'authority' in the sc ience of the day , a 
role nowadays played by empirical methods of scientific validation. The opinion of the 
individual scientist acquires validity, in the Middle Ages, only to the extent that it can be 
shown to be supported by the prevailing opinion among the auctores. Thu s the scientist's 
job is to assemble a representative selection of experts or authorities in a way which will 
establish the compatibility with tradition of the view he favours. 7 
Of course not all commentaries reflect either hagiography or slavish adherence to 
tradition. In every age commentaries have been written in a spirit of sometimes pugi li st ic 
criticism. When Aquinas comments on Augustine he is most disrespectful. Some com-
mentators treat texts merely as decorative vehicles for the transmission of their own ideas. 
When Gilbert of Poitiers comments on Boethius ' De Trinitate, he transforms the whole 
philosophical basis in so doing. Some commentaries are written in order to demonstrate 
the importance of a work hitherto di smissed on all sides as unimportant. Yet each of these 
genres is, I would submit, capable of arising and surviving only against the background 
of an entrenched commentary tradition of a hagiographical or exegetical sort. For the 
given authors achieve their effects preci sely by employing the schemes and devices of a 
commentary literature of the more standard sort. 
Note, too, that even the writing ofhagiographic commentaries can be compatible with 
the expounding of new and critical ideas . Already in Jewish, Eastern Christian and Indian 
commentary much criticism is allowed, though only if the code is superficially adhered 
to. Thus for example one may never say of an authority that he is wrong or inconsistent, 
but only for example that he is "difficult to understand". In this way there may be effected 
an infiltration of new and original ideas, though these must never be announced as such. 
Six conditions 
We can accordingly list the followin g conditions for the appearance of commentaries 
around a given text in a given culture. First we have three necessary conditions: 
i. The text must enjoy a certain density or inaccess ibility or seeming incompleteness 
or foreignness , so that it is not readily understandable to all (not even to the intellectual 
elite) . 
ii. The language and style of the text must serve in this culture as the object of a quite 
special (for example literary) fascination. 
iii . The exact words of the author must be of importance as such (it must for some 
reason be seen as worthwhile to grapple with the difficulties posed by these very words). 
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In addition, we can formulate three dispositional laws to the effect that commentaries 
will be especially forthcoming where: 
iv. Tradition or authority is treated in the given culture as a principal court of appeal 
in the evaluation of scientific or other sorts of assertions. 
v. The text is conceived and produced as part of a universal or encyclopedic philoso-
phy. 
vi. The text enjoys a certain cultural or national or religious significance in its own 
right. (This is sometimes at one remove, where a minor text inherits significance from the 
independently established notoriety of its author, or is granted retrospectively a special 
historical significance, for example because its language is no longer used.) 
These six conditions are of course not independent. On the contrary, they map 
interconnecting aspects of a single underlying structure. This is seen for example in the 
fact that, where the texts characteristic of English-language philosophy since Locke 
satisfy none of the listed conditions, many texts of German philosophy satisfy them all. 
And in relation to other cultures, too, the six conditions can be seen to be closely linked. 
Consider the results of applying them to the case of, say, the Talmud, or the American 
Constitution. 
The case of Wittgenstein 
Commentaries have been made, now, to Wittgenstein's writings not because Wittgen-
stein employs in his philosophy a difficult language. Rather, such commentaries are made 
first of all in reflection of the special difficulties created by the peculiar forms in which 
these writings have come down to us - something which holds true, albeit for different 
reasons, just as much for the Tractatus as for Wittgenstein's later writings . Secondly, 
however, commentaries are made to Wittgenstein's writings because it has become 
necessary to fill the gaps, and to create the context and interconnections of the thoughts 
expressed therein. Wittgenstein's writings accordingly enjoy just that density , inaccessi-
bility and seeming incompleteness that we referred to above as the first condition for the 
generation of a commentary literature. Moreover, it is undeniable that the language and 
style of his writings makes them the object of a special intrinsic fascination. At least to 
many of his followers, Wittgenstein's exact words are of importance as such. And to a 
much greater extent than is the case in relation to the other principal figures of the analytic 
tradition, Wittgenstein's writings can justifiably be seen as part of a universal or 
encyclopedic philosophy. 
Wittgenstein, then, uniquely among the authors standardly associated with this tradi-
tion and almost certainly against his own desires, has succeeded in creating philosophical 
texts in the classical sense, objects which are worthy of commentary and which enjoy a 
certain literary merit. Other analytic authors have normally not been interested in 
producing texts in this sense (for example because they shun aesthetic or literary concerns 
as unscientific). Or where they have displayed such an interest (as for example in the case 
of Robert Nozick's "unreadable book"8) , they have markedly failed in their attempts . 
School philosophy 
It was the duty of the rhapsodes in Ancient Greece not only to recite, but also to explain 
Homer. The first commentaries were in this sense quite literally inextricable from the text 
(song) which served as their object. Thus the roots of the commentary tradition reach far 
back into the times of oral culture, and the persistence of this legacy is seen in the 
conventions still in force in the Renaissance era, for example in respect of the stock forms 
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of the prologue or ingressus in which the commentary introduces itself to its readers. 9 
What is ruled out in the case of a sung text, for example the presence of a title page, is 
missing also in most medieval commentaries. Such commentaries reveal also, in comparison 
with what is current today, a quite different understanding of literary property, of 
plagiarism, and of citation. The concept of an author as the creator of a text as some sort 
of enduring, transportable object (a concept of the sort that is laid down in our present laws 
of copyright) can gain no hold in an oral culture , and aspects of it came to development 
in the manuscript-culture only slowly, so that as late as the 14th century many commentaries 
are still constructed via a simple and unashamed paraphrasing or condensing or gluing 
together of earlier works. 
Philosophy (science), in an oral culture, is perforce not a body of fixed doctrine which 
can be treated as it were impersonally and from without. Rather it is a serious discipline 
of mnemotechnics, designed to bring about the training of the minds who will serve as the 
carriers of the discipline into the future. It is this which explains why the new-fangled 
chicanery of "writing" was initially seen by some to be a positive danger. As the possibly 
spurious 7th Letter of Plato has it: "no serious man will ever think of writing about serious 
realities for the general public" . And: 
when anyone sees anywhere the written work of anyone , whether that of a lawgiver 
in his laws or whatever it may be in some other form, the subject treated cannot 
have been his most serious concern (344 c) . 
Again and again Plato criticizes the Sophists for the exaggerated respect which they 
demonstrated for the written word. Such an attitude , as Plato conceived matters, 
was bound to weaken or even to destroy physical memory, on which the whole oral 
tradition of the past was based, and in the end would be a threat to true philosophy, 
which needs the personal intercourse of the dialectician to plant the living word in 
the soul of the listener. 10 
Thus true and serious philosophy can take place only within the compass of a school; 
it is constituted not as a fixed body of 'propositions' but as an oral tradition. And a school 
is initially defined precisely by the fact that its members accept a common authority 
(Plato, Aristotle, Thomas, Scotus). Indeed, a philosopher in the Middle Ages inscribes 
himself as member of a school because he wishes to grasp the meaning of just these texts, 
so that the work of the school consists in nothing other than the making of commentaries. 
The schools will tend, moreover, to be marked by an opposition between two kinds of 
writing, the esoteric and exclusive "inner writings", which will contain the properly 
important doctrines and formulations directed to initiates, and more popular writings 
directed to the "outside". While the surviving writings of Plato seem in many cases to bear 
all the marks of such popular outer writings, those of Aristotle are rather internal logoi of 
a school. As Owens puts it in relation to Aristotle's Metaphysics: "In general, the style and 
technique of the Books have not the character of writings ever intended to be 'published', 
in the sense of being directed to an undetermined public. " 11 Rather, they must be inter-
preted in relation to definite school activity. 
Where they are negative in their attitude towards a particular Aristotelian doctrine, 
they presume ignorance of that doctrine only in the "hearers". They reveal nothing of 
Aristotle's own knowledge or ignorance, at the time, of that particular doctrine. 12 
For this reason, too, students of philosophy will require the assistance of commentaries 
as their distance increases from the prime sources of their school, and it is above all from 
this point of view that we are to understand the practice of compiling the 'long' or 'major' 
251 
or 'literal' commentaries to the corpus of Aristotle's writings by Averroes or Thomas , 
which stick firmly to the order and content of the given object-work, reproducing each 
successive text-passage in its entirety and seek ing to establish it s 'correct' interpretation. 
With the growth in size of the accredited master literature there come to be required also 
compendia of the sort illustrated by the lihri sententiarum of Isidore of Seville or Peter 
of Lombardy , which are systematically organized compilations of quotations from the 
Church Fathers and other auctores, in some ways designed to achieve for theology what 
codification had achieved in the fields of civil and canon law. Question-commentaries 
such as the Sic et Non of Abelard extend thi s model by citing conflicting pa irs of sentences 
drawn from authoritative sources, accompanying these with attempts at systematic 
resolution of the contradictions. All these forms are a direct expression of teaching-
practices current in colleges and seminaries in the Middle Ages. Thomas and Scotus had 
to write commentaries, simply because they were university professors endowed with the 
task of conveying and explaining from day to day successive portions of the relevant 
master texts. 
And now it seems that Wittgenstein , too - for all that it is difficult to imagine him 
actually saying thi s out loud - understood the true and serious bus iness of philosophy as 
something that could properly take pl ace only within the compass of a school. Philosophy 
is forhim after all not a body of doctrine but an activity. Moreover, his treatment ofWaismann 
and others not only makes clear that Wittgenstein was concerned to preserve a certain 
exclusivity of his following; it also reveals traces of just that opposition between esoteric 
"inner writings" and more popular writings for the 'outside' which was characteristic of 
school philosophy in its earlier manifestations. Wittgensteinian philosophy has been 
marked also by the gradual spreading of the phenomena of glossing and compilation. For 
where Wittgenstein himself is no longer available to explain the meaning and connection 
of his gnomic sayings, then it became necessary to produce commentaries on and 
epitomes of hi s thought. Compilations are made even of the very sc raps and shavings of 
hi s writings , in accordance with the venerable doctrine put forward by Albert the Great 
in his commentary on the Book of Baruch to the effect that one must "collect the scraps" 
(John vi.12), for everything that "proceeds from the mouth of a blessed man must be well 
said".13 
A conclusion 
The commentary belongs essentially to the sphere of preserved communication, as 
contrasted with the "casual and ephemeral converse of daily transaction". 14 And we 
nowadays tend naturally to assume - not least as a result of the influence of Wittgenstein 
himself - that this area of common speech is fundamental , where the area of ethos and 
experience that is preserved in the prime tex ts of universal or encyclopedic philosophy is 
somehow supernumerary and derivative. Something like this seems to underlie the 
assumption common among Anglo-Saxon philosophers to the effect that the activity of 
logical and philosophical puzzle-solving ought properly to precede the (sometimes 
optional) business of coping with the old-established master tex ts of the discipline of 
philosophy . From the non-Anglo-Saxon perspective, in contrast , which is to say from the 
perspective of a philosophical commentary culture, it is the preserved word that is 
fundamental. As Hugutio of Pisa expressed it around 1200, the auctoritas that is pos-
sessed by the master texts of such a culture is a matter of sentenlia digna imitatione, of 
wise sayings worthy of imitation. 15 For it was once recognized by all philosophical 
cultures that ce rtain individuals enjoy a peculiar facility, or tacir knowledg e, in the 
business of philosophy. And as Oakeshott points out , tacit or practica l knowledge "can 
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neither be taught nor learned , but only imparted and acquired. It exists only in practice" . 16 
Hence, just as it was recognized in all earlier cultures that apprentice painters need to learn 
the tacit skills of their art by copying the paintings of the masters , so also it was recognized 
that students of philosophy need to imitate the activity and style of thinking of the 
philosophical masters by commenting on their works. From this perspective, at least , the 
activities of contemporary Wittgenstein-commentators are only to be welcomed- though 
for reasons which are not in all respects compatible either with Wittgenstein ' s own image 
of himself or with the content of his philosophy. 
Notes 
1 I am grateful to Johannes Brandl for perceptive comments on an earlier version of thi s paper. 
2 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of" Eminent Philosophers, IX, 15 and Geffcken , p. 399. 
As Havelock points out: "This is the historical genesis, the f(ms et origo , the moving cause 
of that phenomenon we still call 'poetry'." (p. 43) 
4 Havelock, p. 29. Cf. also Pfeiffer, p. 5. 
Minnis, pp. 177ff. 
6 Minnis, p. 10. See also Specht. 
7 The rule of coherence with general scientific opinion has not, of course, lost its hold entirely 
as a method of validation. (Citation indexes, such as have been constructed with great effort 
for the major texts of medieval philosophy, continue to have their uses even today.) No lon-
ger is this rule taken to imply, however, that the scientist must cast what he has to say in the 
form of interpretations of theses already formulated by earlier masters; and no longer is it 
the case that the reputation of a scientist is a function of the number and breadth of the aucrores 
he himself is in a position to cite. 
8 See Nozick, p. 1. 
9 See Minnis, pp. l 8ff., 28f.; Sandkilhler, pp. 24ff. 
10 Pfeiffer, pp. 31 f. 
11 1963, p. 75. See also Jaeger, pp. 136f. 
12 Owens , p. 77. Thus: 
Where they use an aporematic technique, they presuppose only that the question at issue 
is not yet decided in the minds of the 'hearers.' ... The 'esoteric and quasi-personal ' 
character of the treatises reflects only the actual concrete conditions which Aristotle 
acknowledges in a definite and very limited group of 'hearers.' (loc. cit.) 
13 Cf. Minnis, pp. 99 , 204f. On the more general importance of the idea of orality in the under-
standing of Wittgenstein see the paper by J.C . Nyiri "On Esperanto" in this volume . 
14 Havelock, p. 134. 
15 Minnis , pp. 1 77ff. 
16 1962, p. 11. Recall the passage from Plato ' s 7th Letter quoted above . 
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